

**Regional Integration In The Southern African Development Community
(SADC): A Case Study Of Namibia's Cross Border Migration Issues In
Oshikango**

By

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Abstract

The article is directly the product of research performed as part of the PhD dissertation on Politics and Public Management offered by the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University of Namibia. The main objective of this article was to investigate issues of cross-border migration and their effects on the project of the SADC regional integration. A case study of the border area around the Oshikango town at the Namibia/Angola border has yielded the empirical data. The data were gathered about the distribution of variables such as grassroots community's understanding and attitudes towards implications of cross border migration as measured against the SADC project of regional integration. Other important variables that support investigation techniques are gender, age and education level of respondents. Informed by this investigation and based on the Oshikango case study this article has arrived at the conclusion that SADC is currently unable to achieve its goal of regulating free movement of persons in the region. The problematic seems to be that since SADC is state-based regime, member states take their refuge in the doctrine of state sovereignty, often at the expense of the common regional agenda, in other words they talk regionalism, but they act nationally. This characterised SADC as a shallow integration with limited involvement of civil society and local communities, and hence, cross-border migration control in the region became an issue. Induced by these conclusions, this article recommended encouragement of trans-frontier special development arrangements such as parks and corridors deeply integrated in trans-boundary grassroots communities.

Key words: *Migration; Cross-border; Regionalism; Regional Integration;*

Introduction and background

One fundamental argument remains that before colonialism, Africa was without borders whilst colonialism was concomitant with the drawing of artificial borders, sometimes through incorrect contours and locations. The resultant consequence was Africa's new paradigm and its constituent concepts of nationalism and sovereignty. This, in turn, created issues of migration, border disputes and above all, unequal economic development.

The recent past introduced new ideas of regional and continental reunion through regional integration models. However, the stumbling block in African endeavours to integrate was predominantly the colonial borders. This, as Mmegi (2005) accentuates, implies that there is no denying that the colonial borders erected around modern states are an impediment to the realisation of integration and free movement of people in Africa and the SADC Region. The major effect may be that small economies and small populations within SADC could make it harder for the region to get a fair share from the global markets and hence make it fragile. This fragility weakens Regional Integration Projects in Africa in general and SADC in particular. Most African literature also recognises that reality. Breytenbach (1999) recognised the fact that artificial boundaries in Africa, whether hard or soft, are the major root cause of problems of nation-building on the continent. Members of disparate groups, for example, may become citizens of particular states, which due to various artificial and natural factors fail to cater for them and consequently the phenomenon of emigration develops.

The challenging dynamics that often receive less attention in current research on regional integration are issues of trans-border communities. Referring to these issues, Illés (2003) argues that the problem lies with the borders where the people in the neighbouring areas belong to the same ethnic group and divisions. In this case, close family networks bind these people together. Their relatives live on both sides of the border, and the international border is only a political demarcation with little influence on ethnic, linguistic or social phenomena. Arguably, this would result in overt wrangling between the political and ethnic matrix, especially when relatives visit each other across the borders. Politically, these people are migrants once they cross over to either side of the border, while ethnically, they are in their home area. In other words, local communities and political elites operate on two distinct repertoires, i.e. local communities tend to disregard international borders largely for cultural and socio-economic reason, while the political elites tend to safeguard borders based on sovereignty and constitutional grounds.

Transfrontier Ethnic Diaspora in Africa

Memory politics and cross-frontiers ethnic relations are imperative exacerbations of cross border migration and associated issues in Africa and the SADC region. One scenario in Africa, as Rowlands argues, is that the mixture of people (so-called ethnic groups) are diverse enough to include, for example, the Kuria, Luo and Masai along the Kenya-Tanzania border, Rwandans and Burundians along the Rwanda-Uganda and Burundi-Tanzania borders, the Kakwa and Nubi along the Uganda-Sudan border; and the Somali along the Kenya-Somali and Somali-Ethiopia borders, (Rowlands ,1998:356).

Given these cross-border ethnic Diasporas, Rowlands (ibid) further explains that to these ethnic groups, borders are artificial structures interfering with long-standing ethnic solidarity. The ultimate result is undocumented increase in migration, especially between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The same phenomenon may also be better understood from the perspective of the Nyemba community that resides on both sides of the Kavango River between Namibia and Angola (Theart 2001), the Shona between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the Ndebele between Zimbabwe and South Africa and the Kalanga between Zimbabwe and Botswana. All these have strong ties across the borders. .This creates problems in terms of border crossing with various intentions including visiting family members or relatives on either side of the border or as Mokoena, et al (2001:2) has stated, for medical attention, education and business.

The current dilemma that poses a threat to the SADC's ideal of free movement of persons is that the grassroots communities do not fully recognise or respect the colonial borders. A century after Southern Africa was demarcated into boundaries, the grassroots communities still regard boundaries as alien barriers and nuisances imposed on them by Europeans, which block their traditional mobility across regions. This arouses curiosity about who drew these boundaries, for whom and predominantly, in whose interest? Any one or two of the following colonial powers played a decisive role in fixing three or more boundaries of Southern African countries: France, Spain Portugal, Britain, Belgium, Germany and Italy. They drew the boundaries that suited the interest of European countries, which according to Prescott,

“...saw Africa as an el Dorado of unknown resources, a place for manufactured goods, a continent where middle class public servants and soldiers could find employment which would advance their status, a people that desperately needed deliverance from the evils of slavery and spiritual oppression, an area with only a few, key strategic locations in terms of communications, and the place of naval power”. (Prescott, 1997:243).

Understanding of conflicts and disputes inclusive of boundary allocations by European countries cannot be confined to cross-border migration and border disputes, but could include their negative impact on the social and economic lives of people. Because of boundary allocations, unfortunate people might receive a tiny part of an area, regardless of population size, as their country (microstate), or an abnormal portion (macrostate) that would become a burden to manage. These boundaries were drawn in the name of greed. Quite unbelievably, the British, Belgian and Portuguese colonial powers carved out these boundaries in a very short time after 1885, hence making serious mistakes at that time.

Macrostates in Africa such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola etc. were made too big, and thus became difficult to manage successfully (Breytenbach, 1999). On the other hand, microstates such as Rwanda, Burundi, the Gambia, Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea were made too small for viability, hence Breytenbach (1999) terms these boundaries as absurdities. The consequence is that the sizes of these countries might now plague them with social and economic problems. The people squeezed into microstates might flee in search of better social and economic space, and those people scattered in vast macrostates might flee from anarchy to better-controlled states. Currently, migrants from either small countries, which have difficulties to keep their large population inside, or large countries, which have difficulties to successfully extend their control to the furthest corners, exacerbate existing cross-border issues in the SADC countries, particularly in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.

Not only the size of the country matters; resources are also unevenly distributed within these countries. Imagine a tiny country like Malawi, with a total area of 45,745 sq mi i.e. 118,480 sq km and a Population of 13,013,926 (2006 estimate) with an economy depending predominantly on beans, cassava, cotton, ground nuts, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, sugar, tea and tobacco (Infoplease 2000-2006). These people are victims of a boundary that limits their area to such an extent that it cannot satisfy their needs. This could be regarded as one of the major triggers of emigration to the greener pastures and other social and economic survivals in other countries, predominantly in this case, South Africa.

Unequal Economic Development and Migration Trends in SADC

Asymmetries of economies of countries in the SADC region are currently a matter of concern, for example, Jauch (2003) indicates that the Southern African region has the highest inequalities in the world with some suffering from political instability. With these disparities, as Mmegi (ibid) argues, it is difficult and not too wise to talk of free movement of people. This blatant typical obstinacy gives indications that the SADC Free Trade Area planned for 2008 is also at stake if member states fail to reach consensus on a Protocol of the Facilitation of the Free Movement of Persons in the region. The free movement of persons referred to, in this regard, simply, as Munyuki (ibid) argues, refers to the

dismantling of barriers in the SADC region such as visa requirements, which operate to restrict the movement of human beings across national borders. Although some writers such as Solomon (1996) oppose this idea critiquing that the free movement of people in the SADC Region will benefit neither the more developed nor the least developed states of Southern Africa due to the economic asymmetry of the region, some such as Colin disagree by stating that

“in the SADC Free Trade Agreement the unequal nature of the economies is addressed through asymmetry in tariff phase downs in favour of South Africa’s SADC partners. In the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) the smaller and less developed member states benefit from mathematical gymnastics in the formula used to distribute customs union revenue” (Colin 2005).

In support of Colin’s thought, not only a fair distribution of revenue that would benefit the region, but free labour movement can also strengthen regional economy. However, in this regard, the current issue of contention is “free movement of persons” across SADC member states.

This indicates that one major challenging component evident in discourses on free movement of persons is labour movement in the SADC region. Jauch (2003) argues that the unions under the umbrella of the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) are concerned that narrow economic concerns of SADC states have overridden the political aspirations for regional integration. This means that individual states have increasingly been pursuing competing policies at the national level, which at the same time contradict efforts towards regional integration. Jauch (2003) further quotes the Regional Policy and Planning Workshop (1995:4) that asserts that free movement of labour within the current context of economic inequality and polarisation will lead to a drain of skilled people and influx of unskilled immigrants into richer countries in the region.

In addition, McDonald, et al (2000) assert that from exploitative labour practices and deferred pay systems to the transmission of AIDS and the stretching of families in some countries in and outside the SADC region, there is ample evidence to suggest that cross-border migration has served to undermine the social, cultural and economic integrity of the SADC states. Hence, it can be acceptable that facilitation of free movement of persons in the region is gravely undermined by various factors. One of them is that the supra-national member states also differ among themselves, particularly in passing controversial protocols such as the SADC Draft Protocol of the Free Movement of Persons. For instance, although South Africa signed this protocol in 2005, she initially perceived the SADC initiatives to promote the free movement of persons within the region as ‘Eurocentric’ and which would impose an appropriate European Economic Community (EEC) model on Southern Africa (Oucho and Crush

2001:140) as quoted in HSRC, 1995, Hough, 2000 and Solomon, 2000. Consequently, South Africa revised the 1995 SADC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons to construct an alternative Protocol that suits the perception of South Africans, but possibly not that of the regional SADC nationals.

Some critics even conceive the original draft of the Protocol as state-centric, inviting less attention from the civil society and community at grassroots level. Since the grassroots community whose everyday life is affected by national boundaries, are poorly informed about the importance of the borders, they also show little respect for such borders. In addition, since they continually and regularly commute across the borders, it is impossible to determine their nationalities. As became evident in the case study below some people living along the borders, for example between Namibia and Angola may possess dual citizenship without realising its illegality.

A case study: Cross-border migration issues between Namibia and Angola

Given problems above, it appears that most recent literature on issues of migration in the SADC Region focuses more on South Africa. To add more knowledge, this article selected Oshikango between Namibia and Angola as a site of investigation to explore the dynamics of cross-border migration in Southern Angola and Northern Namibia. Oshikango was chosen as a study laboratory for various reasons. Historically, Oshikango is one of the few border towns bisected by international borders in the SADC Region and it is one of the oldest official border posts between Namibia and Angola. The town is located in the Kwanyama community living on both sides of the Namibia/Angola common border, sharing the same cultural values and family ties and above all speaking the same language.

Economically, the Namibian government, through the development of an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) Industrial Park has enhanced Oshikango's position as an economic growth point. Since the launch of the Industrial Park, worth N\$20 million, in 1997, the area has become a hive of commercial activity between Namibia and Angola (Shivute 2003). The EPZ incentives received a considerable boost, evident in the new railway line from Tsumeb to Oshikango via Ondangwa/Oshakati, which will eventually link up with the Angolan railway system at a point near Cassinga/Chamutete on the line running from Namibe to Menongue (Dierks :n.d). Such a connection will promote trade between all the countries within the region (through Oshikango gateway), but especially between Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

Politically, Oshikango's lifestyle is influenced by the politics of two countries. The movement of people and goods between the two countries is a variable depending on the political climate of either country. Socially, traditional, cultural


and family ties have created major difficulties for the communities to accept modern laws and cross border controls, which to them are alien phenomena.

Oshikango, Kwanyama and Aawambo socio-political contexts

Oshikango is historically an area within the Oshikwanyama-speaking community of the Aawambo tribe in northern Namibia and southern Angola. The colonial border between Namibia and Angola that cuts through the Kwanyama community divides the town into two parts, namely: the Namibian part (Oshikango) and Angolan part (Santa Clara). Amutenya and van der Linden (1993) correctly state that the Namibia/Angola border is in fact a colonial border dissecting the living space of two homogeneous population groups, the Kwanyama and Mbandja. Alluding to similar border implications, Hayes (1992:264) argues that “direct effects such as the locating of homesteads and fields were felt mainly by the Kwanyama, but also the Mbalantu and smaller western polities.” This was supported by Malan (1995) who argued that the Namibia/Angola border that cuts through the Kwanyama territory made about a third of the members of this group citizens of Angola today.

Before the advent of colonialism, the Aawambo in general and the Kwanyama in particular, occupied the whole area between the Cunene and Cuado rivers. For example, Kreike (1994:1) argues that in the last decades of the 19th century and until the colonial occupation of Owamboland and the Lower Kunene was finalised in 1915, Owambo cattle-farmers sent their herds to cattle posts throughout and even beyond the Lower Kunene (see Map 1 below).

Map 1: Sketchmap of Aawambo Diaspora after 1930




Source: Kreike (1994)

With reference to Map1 above, Kreike (ibid), indicates that the Aawambo's cattle could be found along the Cuvelai and Oshimolo Rivers, the eastern bank of the Kunene River, the western bank of the Cubango River, the Etosha Pan in the south and as far north as Cassinga.

Although the Owambos did not have homesteads in those places, they usually migrated to stay there during the dry season for grazing. They declared the whole area between the Etosha Pan and Lower Kunene as their territory and established their political and social structure based on their cultural values and social organisation. In support of this argument, Davies (n.d) (as quoted in Duparquet 1935; Loeb 1948; Aarni 1982, Tuupainen 1970; Hahn 1928 and Delachaux and Thiebaud 1933) adds that the Owambo Region was located on an alluvial flood plain about 1,200m above sea level, which slopes gently from the north. While the Owambo shared parts of northern Namibia and southern Angola, in Namibia the Owambo area covers 56, 000 sq km between latitude 17.30 and 18.30 S, and Longitude 14.00E and 17.30 W. The Owambo area in Namibia extends as far north as the international boundary with Angola and almost as far south as the Etosha Pan. The Owambo area in Angola is situated between the Kunene and Kavango Rivers and extends roughly 200km northwards from the Angola/Namibia border.

According to Salokoski (2006) the period of Owambo migration to their current settlement, which historians suggest would have begun about 1550-1600. They lived in seven separate societies or kingdoms, although some literature reflects otherwise, namely, Ondonga, Uukwambi, Uukwaluudhi, Ongandjera, Ombalantu, Uukolonkadhi and Uukwanyama. Salokoski (2006) further explains that, "for a long time vast forest lands separated the individual settlements and societies from each other". Map 2 below shows the different Owambo societies as they featured in the early 1900s.

Map 2 : Map of Owambo kingdoms on both sides of Angolan border



Source: Salokoski (2006)

Map 2 above depicts the vast open spaces between the different Owambo kingdoms on both sides of the Angolan border. The political structure of the Owambo is organised on a tribal basis. A hereditary chief, assisted in the tribal administration by a council of headmen, headed the tribal organisation. The territory was divided into districts (Oikandjo) headed by senior headmen and wards (Omikunda) (given specific names such as Odibo, Onamunhama, Oshikango, etc.) headed by sub-headmen Malan (1995). Hence, Oshikango border town is named after the Oshikango ward meaning a “*small water stream*” in Oshiwambo. Like all wards that cut through by the colonial border, the Oshikango ward also bisects the Namibia/Angola border at present.

After Namibia’s independence, the former Owamboland on the Namibian side was re-demarcated into new political regions, namely: Oshana, Oshikoto,

Omusati, and Ohangwena with constituencies, hence the name Oshikango was also given to the regional constituency that houses the Oshikango border town in the Ohangwena Region. Santa Clara is the Angolan border town situated a stone's throw away across the border from Oshikango but it is still situated in Oshikango ward, although one sub-headman no longer rules the ward across the border. Therefore, this article covers Oshikango as a town, a ward and a constituency and extends to a small distance to include surrounding wards on the Namibian side.

Clan network interspersion

As discussed above, the most important social disposition of the Kwanyama ethnic group is the family or interchangeably clan network dissected by the Angola/Namibia border. Kane-Berman (n.d) described the Kwanyama-speaking community network as a pattern of homes straddling the border between South West Africa and Angola and their family¹ and clans network also follow this living pattern. In the previous sub-section, we concluded that there is increasing evidence of clan links between Namibia and Angola. Malan (ibid) indicates that Owambos demonstrate their kinship bond by using classificatory kinship terminology or clan names such as Aakwaanyoka clan, (the clan of the snake family), Aakwanambwa (the clan of the dog family), Aakwaudimbe/Kwaniilya (the clan of the grain family), to mention but a few. This web of clan structures forms a diaspora that covers the entire northern Namibia and southern Angola. Hahn et al (1966:109) lists the existing clans among the Kwanyama and in general among Ambo² of northern Namibia and southern Angola as follows:

1. *Ovakwanangombe* – From *Ongombe* “Ox”.
2. *Ovakwanambwa* - From *Ombwa* “dog”.
3. *Ovakwamalanga* – From *Omalanga* “roan antelope”.
4. *Ovakwasidila* – From (*Odila*)^{*3} “bird”.
5. *Ovakwaanime* - From *Onime* “lion”.
6. *Ovakwahepo* – From *Oluhepo* “poverty”.
7. *Ovakwanehungi* – From *Ohungi* “germanous plant”.
8. *Ovakwanekemba*- From *Ekamba* “hyena”.
9. *Ovakwaluvala*- From *Oluvala* “stripe” referring to the striped animal the “Zebra”.
10. *Ovakwaanyoka*- From *Eyoka* “serpent” “snake”.
11. *Ovakwanyika*- From *Onyika* “torch”.
12. *Ovakwanghali*- From *Onghali** “mourning” “funeral rite”
13. *Ovakwangandu*- From *Ongandu* “crocodile”.
14. *Ovakwanailia* or (*Ovakwaudibe*)*- From oilya “grain or millet”.
15. *Ovakwahongo* – From *Omuhongo*- “a tree (*spirostachys africanus*)”.

¹ In Oshiwambo, “family” refers to a relationship of clan members – meaning that all members of one clan are regarded as a family.

² Some writers use “Ambo” to refer to Aawambo or Ovambo.

³ * reflects own words in the quotation.

16. *Ovakwanambuba*- From *Ombuba* “an insect found in the inside of the wild figs”.
17. *Ovakwaneidi*- From *Eidi* or (*Omwiidi*)* “grass”.
18. *Ovakwanaiuma*- From *Oiuma* “clay pots”.
19. *Ovakwanelumbi* – The same as the *Ovakwananime* (number 5).

The strong ties transcending the common border and embedded in the matrilineal Aawambo clans embody an impasse in cross-border migration control and pose a threat to state authority and sovereignty. The fact in this respect is that you cannot separate the Kwahepo in Angola from their relative Kwahepo in Namibia by law, since this would infringe on their human rights and civil liberty. Morally, these people feel a strong sense of belonging to their clans regardless of international boundaries and thus it is difficult for the state to break this line, which to a certain extent involves top government officials in Namibia and Angola.

The intermarriage network is reflected in relationships that exist in the form of matrilineal clan structures. The matriclan social system primarily determines inter-marriage relationships within the Aawambo including the Namibian Kwanyama and Angolan Kwanyama. During his research in the area of Oshikango and within the South West Africa (SWA)⁴ Kwanyama, Banghart's (1969) informants were South West African Kwanyama headmen married to Angolan wives and vice-versa. For example, SWA headmen such as Gabriel, Hifelelenga and another Gabriel were among others, married to Angolan Kwanyama wives. In this regard, their children belonged to the Angolan side because the Oshiwambo matriclan system allows the child to be part of the mother's side. Although these children were born in SWA, they were psychologically prepared to regard Angola, which is the origin of their mothers as their place to belong and in this case the maternal Angolan uncles and aunts as their family.

This move motivates cross-border migration and makes control of cross-border mobility difficult if not impossible. This problem is not only confined to micro perspectives of individual state endeavours geared to control day-to-day cross-border movements, but also, as stated above, poses a threat to state autonomy and sovereignty. For example, the issue of uncertainty about citizenship of the people sharing the common border between Namibia and Angola is a challenge to Namibia's Constitution. Questioning this constitutional challenge, Klaaren and Rutinwa (2004:95) refer to a group of residents who have been in Namibia for many years but remain nationals of Angola; these people are precluded from citizenship in terms of Namibia's law, in part because of non-renunciation policies of their country of origin, namely Angola.

Citizenship implications between Namibia and Angola

⁴ Namibia was known as South West Africa before independence.

Since Angola's policy does not provide for the citizen to cancel the Angolan citizenship before taking the citizenship of another country, speculation is high that those people who were born in Angola and currently reside in Namibia are still Angolans and cannot be allowed to obtain Namibian citizenship. However, in similar vein, Klaaren and Rutinwa's (ibid) finding proves to be not very explicit, because it fails to disclose the fact that after independence Namibia's Constitution of 1990 provided for a grace period for all people who had lived in Namibia for more than five years to automatically apply for Namibian citizenship. According to Article 4 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia of 1990:

“Citizenship by registration may be claimed by persons who are not Namibian citizens under Sub-Article (1), (2) or (3) hereof and who were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the date of Independence, and had been so resident for a continuous period of not less than five (5) years prior to such date: provided that application for Namibian citizenship under this Sub-Article is made within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of independence, and prior to making such application, such persons renounce the citizenship of any other country of which they are citizens.”

The major issue here is not the precluding policy, but the cross-border family network and trans-boundary migration phenomenon, which Du Pisani as quoted in Reitzes (2005:5) argues challenges the autonomy, security and sovereignty of state authority. This transpires in many ways. For example, although Namibia's Constitution provides for that right above, migration and citizenship issues between Namibia and Angola remain complicated. The problem in this regard is that mixed Namibian and Angolan Oshikwanyama-speakers in northern Namibia pose dilemmas for the authorities to identify those people who have ordinarily been in Namibia for more than five years to qualify for citizenship in terms of the Constitutional provisions. Therefore, it is not true that Namibia's intolerant policy is effective in Oshikango due to what this study terms “subtle dual citizenship”. In this light, Du Pisani (ibid) also argues that trans-boundary migration has implications, which intersect with a number of other issues and will therefore be very difficult to address.

Interviews with households at Oshikango

Interviews which were conducted between June and August 2005 at Oshikango had revealed empirical reality on the implications of international borders and challenges of cross border migration in the SADC region. At this stage, we should look at these migration implications based on transboundary family Diasporas between Namibia and Angola (see Table 1) below.

Table 1: Household respondents: Country of birth, self, parents, spouse

Sex	Country	
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		Namibia	Angola	Other countries	Total
Male	Self	44 (91.7%)	24 (8.3%)		33 (100.0%)
	Father	39(83.0%))	8 (17.0%)		33 (100.0%)
	Mother	39 (83.0%)	8 (17.0%)		33 (100.0%)
	Wife	17 (89.5%)	2 (10.5%)		33 (100.0%)
Female	Self	57 (95.0%)	3 (5.0%)		7 (100.0%)
	Father	52 (89.7%)	6 (10.3%)		7 (100.0%)
	Mother	52 (89.7%)	6 (10.3%)		7 (100.0%)
	Husband	26 (92.9%)	2 (7.1%)		7 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Statistically, 91.7% male respondents and 95% females accepted that they were born and bred in Namibia, while 8.3% males and 5% females were born in Angola. Most respondents did not explain about their current state of citizenship, presumably due to fear of legal action against them. In addition, 83% males and 89.7% females had their fathers born in Namibia, while 83% males and 89.7% females had their fathers and mothers born in Namibia. Finally, 89.5% of male respondents had their spouses born in Namibia, 10.5% admitted to have their spouses from Angola and 92.9% females had their spouses born in Namibia and 7.1% had their husbands from Angola. As normal practice, most people with dubious citizenship in northern Namibia, hide their citizenship status. Seemingly, this commenced after Namibia's independence and the stiffening of migration laws and policies, which Klaaren and Rutinwa (ibid) described as relatively intolerant. This can also be proved from another statistical angle. If we compare the current transboundary intermarriage statistics and Banghart's statistics 36 years ago, the results differ considerably. Banghart (1969:119) states that approximately 7% of the sample reported interclan marriages. Among them, 7% of the Ondonga and 22% of the A/Kwanyama (Angolan Kwanyama) reported intermarriage. Another implication is that the members of the Akwaanyoka clan, for example, on the Namibian side have their clan members, whom they regard as sisters and brothers, in Angola. If one of their clan members in Angola dies, the Namibian brothers and sisters of the clan name would go to Angola to mourn and inherit the wealth, which often may include the mahangu field.

Thus, most respondents give cultivation of mahangu fields as their major reason for crossing the common border to Angola. In this respect, there can thus be little doubt that Kwanyamas on both sides of the common border inherit mahangu fields across the border through matriclan networks. They currently acquire land the way it was done 100 years ago and the present Angolan and Namibian law of land tenure seems silent on the issue. This article leaves this gap of land issues within the Kwanyama along the common Namibia and Angola border for another research. The trends of living discussed in this subsection necessitate the investigation of dual citizenship of the Aakwanyama community in the Oshikango area.

Dual citizenship and state sovereignty

The issue of dual citizenship is global and not only confined to the SADC or to the Oshikango area. In the SADC Region, for example, as Klaaren and Rutinwa (2004:22) explain, five countries either explicitly prohibit dual citizenship or have a rule that mandates loss of citizenship even upon involuntary or marriage-based acquisition of a foreign citizenship. These countries are identified as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In addition, Klaaren and Rutinwa (ibid) also refer to the eight SADC countries, which have policies that are relatively tolerant in regards to dual citizenship as Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles⁵, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. However, in their findings Klaaren and Retina fail to explicitly mention Angola's position in their classifications of tolerant and relatively intolerant citizenship policies of the SADC countries. Angola's citizenship policy has been not clearly defined due to a war situation lasting more than three decades, which disrupted the functioning of the country's administrative machinery and thus created a lack of records. This contributes to the fact that most literature on migration in the SADC Region gives very little consideration to Angola.

Statistically, the household respondents did not show that they had dual citizenship. Interviews were conducted with the assumption that the households in Oshikango had or still have dual citizenship. To the question, whether the respondent had cancelled citizenship of Angola before acquiring Namibian citizenship, the answer was no. In that regard, statistics show that 93.8% male and 98.3 female respondents claim to be *bona fide* Namibians, while only 6.3% male and 1.7% female respondents admitted to being Angolans.

Table 2: Household respondents and the issue of dual citizenship

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	%Within sex
Citizenship	Count	%within sex	Count	%within sex		

⁵ Seychelles is no longer a member of the SADC and Madagascar was accepted in 2005 as indicated in Chapter 1.

Angolan only	3	6.3%	1	1.7%	4	3.7.0%
Namibian only	45	93.8%	59	98.3%	104	96.3%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%		

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

The result in the cross tabulation above, lacks convincing substance. For example, in the follow-up open-ended question, the majority of respondents failed to indicate whether they had held Angolan citizenship before. But, paradoxically, they also indicated in subsequent questions that they had close family such as mothers and fathers in Angola. It is therefore unclear how, when and why these people left their parents in Angola to reside in Namibia. Moreover, they possibly acquired Namibian citizenship before they cancelled their previous Angolan citizenship. If the latter is true, they violated Namibia's laws of citizenship and should have been internally declared 'irregular' or 'illegal migrants'. However, internationally, these people do not fall in the category of irregular or illegal migrants as such. The United Nations Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2006:32) states clearly that "in Europe, for example, where people from outside the European Union are closely controlled, it is relatively easy to identify migrants with irregular status." However, GCIM (ibid) further argues that in many parts of Africa where borders are porous, ethnic and linguistic groups straddle state borders, some people belong to nomadic communities and many people do not have proof of their place of birth or citizenship, it is unfair to call them irregular or illegal migrants. This is also true in the Namibia/Angolan border context. It is a fact that some people born in Angola or Namibia, especially during the time of war or at the beginning of the century were not officially registered as citizens of either country.

The nomadic San communities also move regularly across the border unnoticed or noticed but no one worries about their migration. The evidence is that a large number of people in the Oshikango area could knowingly or unknowingly have dual citizenship, because they acquired Namibian citizenship without renouncing their Angolan citizenship (see statistics below.)

Table 3: Household respondents: Have you ever been a citizen of Angola?

	Sex				Total	
	Male		Female		Count	%Within sex
Previous Angolan citizens	Count	%Within sex	Count	%Within sex		
Yes	4	8.3%	3	5.0%	7	6.5%
No	44	91.7%	57	95.0%	101	93.5%
Total	48	100.0%	60	100.0%	108	100.0%

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

At most 91.7% male and 95.0% female respondents indicated that they had never had Angolan citizenship and only 8.3% males and 5.0% females admitted to having had Angolan citizenship before. However, the precision of data provided above cannot be vouched for since they are in conflict with the data provided earlier in Table 2. This difference in data results occurs because not all respondents were willing to provide true information about their citizenship, due to the fear of arrest and deportation. Respondents themselves also confessed to the confusion of their citizenship profiles that resulted from a number of factors. These included the war of liberation in Namibia and the civil war in Angola. During the time of war, they did not have any fixed abode. They were not static either. They usually shifted with peace. When peace came to Angola, they went to live with their relatives in Angola. When tensions erupted in Angola, they moved over to Namibia to stay with other close relatives such as brothers and sisters. This trend continued after Namibia's independence and the end of the war in Angola. Many people remained uncertain about how to decide on their domicile. Consequently, some people opted to acquire Namibian citizenship only, while some opted for dual citizenship.

Awareness about implications of dual citizenship

The issue of dual citizenship in Oshikango is a state-conscious problem. People at the grassroots level are not conscious of the implications of dual citizenship. Statistics in both Table 4 Awareness within age and Table 5 Awareness within education variable show this reality.

Table 4: Household respondents: Awareness of implications of dual citizenship (within age)

Awareness of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia				
Age	Sex	Yes	No	Total
20 –35	Male	6 (37.5%)	10 (62.5%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	6 (30.0%)	14 (70.0%)	20 (100.%)
36 – 49	Male	2 (12.5%)	14 (87.5%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	3 (15.0%)	17 (85.0%)	20 (100.) (%)
50+	Male	3 (18.8%)	13 (81.3%)	16 (100.0%)
	Female	3 (15.0%)	17 (85.0%)	20 (100.) (%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

Curiously, 62.5% (N=10) male and 70% (N=14) respondents within the age group 20-35 years indicated that they were not aware of the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia since they had not been informed about it. The same applies across all age groups. Statistics indicated that all respondents declined to admit the status of dual citizenship. However, in a follow-up open-ended question, two (2) females and one (1) male disclosed that they still do not hold any citizenship and they take it for granted that they are in their own area. In addition, most respondents revealed in their comments that most of those who claimed to be Namibian citizens today (in Oshikango), did not do so willingly or on their own understanding. They argued that circumstances such as colonial oppression compelled them to seek citizenship. For example, the South African army tortured all those people who failed to produce identity documents, because they were regarded as “SWAPO terrorists.”⁶ Hence, the respondents claimed that the only way to avoid beatings or get access to the south as a migrant labourer was to get a Namibian identity card. Among the respondents, only one (1) man obtained Namibian citizenship during the colonial era in order to be able to get an opportunity to work in *Ombishi* (Angola). He explained that the Namibian identity card was also used as a passport to cross over to Angola to look for employment.

Education also plays a great role in understanding the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia. Table 5 below shows that 80% (N=8) male and 100% (N=16) female respondents with no education are unaware of the implications of dual citizenship in Namibia. But it is interesting to note that awareness about problems of dual citizenship in Namibia grows proportionately with education. This creates another assumption that in some years to come many more people will understand these implications, if many people from both sides of the boundary receive education up to secondary level.

Table 5: Household respondents: Awareness of implications of dual citizenship (within education)

Awareness of implications of dual citizenship in Namibia				
Education level	Sex	Yes	No	Total
None	Male	2 (20.0%)	8 (80.0%)	10 (100.0%)
	Female		16(100.0%)	16 (100. %)
Primary	Male	3 (13.3%)	20(87.0%)	23 (100.0%)
	Female	1 (6.7%)	14 (93.3%)	15 (100. %)
Secondary (Matric or A-Level)	Male	5 (45.5%)	6 (54.5%)	11 (100.0%)
	Female	11 (40.7%)	16 (59.3%)	27(100.0%)
Tertiary (Higher than	Male		2 (100.0%)	2 (100. %)

⁶ SWAPO terrorists was a propaganda term used by South Africa to refer to Freedom Fighters of the South West Africa Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO).

Matrics)	Female		1 (100.0%)	1(100.0%)
Other	Male	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	2 (100. %)
	Female		1 (100.0%)	1 (100.0%)

Source: Interviews with household respondents in Oshikango area (2005)

As data above indicate, female respondents are the majority without knowledge about the implications of dual citizenship. This could be attributed to the fact that they were historically sidelined in many ways, including education. The reality transpires in the fact that at Secondary level 40.7% female respondents have knowledge about implications of dual citizenship compared to 45% of their male counterparts. This indicates that women have high potential of understanding various issues if they were given the opportunities of education and travel. Apart from education and as was the case with the cross-border migrant respondents, women were historically not exposed to travel across countries compared to men and thus the opportunity for them to understand issues of migration and citizenship was small. All sixty (60) women interviewed across all ages indicated that they did not work as migrant workers, because they did not have the right to do so. They were obliged by custom to remain at home looking after the households. After independence, they heard about the new regime of migration laws and policies but these are beyond their comprehension.

The SADC member states should revisit their migration laws to accommodate the concerns of the grassroots communities, especially those affected by the border. In so doing the SADC member states should either strengthen the bilateral agreements or make the transcending *in-situ* sort of cross-border liberalisation system currently found between almost all neighbouring countries legal. For example, the current agreement between Namibia and Angola for a visa-free movement between the two nations is not sufficient because it has only solved visa-related problems while the people, especially those in the Kwanyama diaspora and who understand nothing about visas or passport requirements should be treated differently. This article recommends that development of joint trans-frontier projects across the borders should be encouraged in order to facilitate regionalisation.

Conclusion

This article explains analytically the practical realities pertaining to cross-border migration and regional integration among local communities in the Oshikango area. Observation, oral history and interviews are among other methodological techniques, used to document the down-to-earth living situation at Oshikango and to link it to perspectives of the SADC Regional Integration. This confluence of regional integration, cross-border migration and issues of border intersections dominate the inquiry. However, the article commenced with the historical Diaspora of Aawambo across the Namibia/Angola common border and the extent

to which this has currently been influencing cross-border mobility between the two countries. Historically, Oshikango is an area within the Oshikwanyama-speaking community of the Aawambo tribe in northern Namibia and southern Angola. The colonial border between Namibia and Angola cuts through this ethnic group. Hence, these people in northern Namibia and southern Angola share the same language and culture and have difficulties to understand and accept the common Namibian/Angolan border.

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